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 Abstract 
Water is critical for agriculture, yet surprisingly few studies internationally 
have analysed the value placed on water in specific farming contexts. We do so 
using a rich longitudinal dataset for the Mackenzie District (Canterbury, New 
Zealand) over nineteen years, enabling us to extract the value placed by farmers 
on long-term access to irrigated water. New Zealand has a system of water 
consents under the Resource Management Act (RMA) that enables farmers with 
consents to extract specified quantities of water for agricultural purposes. Some 
water is extracted through large-scale irrigation infrastructure and other flows by 
more localised means; the RMA and the water consents themselves are a critical 
legal infrastructure underpinning farming.  
Using panel methods, we estimate property sale price and assessed 
value as a function of the size of the farm’s water right (if it has one), farm 
characteristics, and the water right interacted with farm characteristics to 
determine how the value of a water consent varies according to local conditions. 
We find that flatter areas and areas with poorly draining soils benefit most from 
irrigation, possibly because the water is retained for longer on these properties. 
Drier areas appear to benefit more from irrigation than do areas with higher 
rainfall. Farms that are situated close to towns derive especially strong benefits 
from irrigation since these properties are most likely to have potential water-
intensive land uses such as dairying and cropping that require access to processing 
facilities and/or an urban labour pool. 
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 1 Introduction 
Water is critical for agriculture, and is becoming increasingly scarce in 
many places.
1 Water allocation mechanisms are often non-existent or based on 
first-come first-served principles that do not allocate water to highest end-uses. 
Irrigation projects may assist in alleviating water scarcities, but they are often 
riddled with inefficiencies related to the lack of efficient allocation of the irrigated 
water.  
The importance of these issues suggests that a large body of evidence will 
be available on the value of water for agricultural and other purposes. Yet 
surprisingly few studies internationally have analysed the value placed on water in 
specific farming contexts. We do so using a rich longitudinal dataset that enables 
us to extract the value placed by farmers on long-term access to irrigated water.  
New Zealand has a system of ‘water consents’ under its Resource 
Management Act (RMA) that enables farmers with consents to extract specified 
quantities of water for agricultural purposes. Extraction of water without a consent 
is illegal. Consents are granted separately for ground and for surface water. Some 
water is extracted through large-scale irrigation infrastructure and other flows by 
more localised means.
2 The RMA and the water consents themselves are a critical 
legal infrastructure underpinning farming. The consents grant farmers the right to 
extract up to a certain quantity of water (defined by maximum flow rates and by 
maximum volume flows over time) generally for 30 years, with possible renewal. 
These consents may enable farmers to change the nature of production on their 
land (e.g. from sheep grazing to arable or to dairying).
3 However the water rights 
                                                           
1 In January 2008, the United Nations Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon addressed the Davos 
World Economic Forum, Switzerland, stating: “The challenge of securing safe and plentiful water 
for all is one of the most daunting challenges faced by the world today. Until only recently, we 
generally assumed that water trends do not pose much risk to our businesses … the notion of water 
sustainability in a broad sense has not been seriously examined.”  
Source: www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sgsm11388.doc.htm , sourced 13 May 2008. 
2 From the 1930s to 1984 there was considerable public investment in community irrigation 
schemes; however since 1985 there has been no direct central government investment in building 
irrigation schemes. See Le Prou (2007) for a history of New Zealand irrigation administration.   
3 Taylor et al (2003) suggest that land use change comes in waves as irrigation availability is 
followed by changes in farm ownership and demographic changes. Consistent with this view, there 
has been a change in the role of irrigation from drought-proofing to being a means of diversifying 
agricultural production. Ford (2002) notes that land use change can take time, so flow benefits of 
 
1 are not tradeable, nor can the water itself be sold. Mostly, consents reflect first-
come, first-served (or “first-applied, first-granted”) rights to water for local land-
owners. If a farm does not use all its entitlement in a certain period, that water is 
“lost” to the consented properties, and no other property can make use of the lost 
water (e.g. by diverting the relevant water for its own use).  
This system means that we do not observe market prices for agricultural 
water in New Zealand. Nevertheless, in parts of New Zealand, including the 
Canterbury Region, water is scarce and a positive shadow price must therefore 
exist for this commodity. The shadow price can be observed implicitly since 
resource consents for water remain with the farm when the property is sold.  Thus 
the sale price will reflect, inter alia, the water consents (or lack of them) belonging 
to the property. Furthermore, if property valuations (for property tax purposes) 
reflect the full value of the farm (as they are required to by law), they will also 
indicate the value placed on water consents for each property. 
We examine the value that farmers place on water consents using a 
specially constructed annual (and triennial) dataset. The dataset covers every rural 
property in one drought-prone New Zealand local authority (Mackenzie District in 
the Canterbury Region
4) over a period of nineteen years. We hypothesise that 
farmers will pay a premium for land that has a water consent and that the value of 
the premium will be determined by the present discounted value of the extra net 
farm income due to the consent. The premium may therefore vary according to 
underlying characteristics of the property (e.g. rainfall, slope, drainage, location) 
which influence the marginal productivity of the consented water.  
Our dataset includes, for every rural property in the region: the sale price 
of the property (if sold), the land value assessed by an independent body 
(Quotable Value New Zealand - QVNZ) for property tax (‘rating’) purposes, and 
the value of improvements on the property (also assessed by QVNZ). The sales 
price (less improvements) and the land value are used, in separate specifications, 
as our dependent variable. They are also used to cross-check the validity of the 
                                                           
 
new irrigation may be delayed. Land prices nevertheless should be forward-looking, so the present 
discounted value of the irrigation should be impounded in the land value.  
4 Canterbury had 287,000 ha (60%) of New Zealand’s irrigated land in the 2002/03 season (MAF, 
2004).     
2 two sets of price/value data. Specifically, we examine whether properties that are 
sold (and hence for which there is an observable sales price) constitute a 
representative sample of the universe of rural properties for which valuation data 
is available. We do so both by comparing data means and by testing (using a 
probit equation) whether the presence of a water consent affects the propensity for 
properties to be traded. In addition, for properties that are sold, we test whether 
assessed capital value (land value plus improvement value) provides an unbiased 
predictor of sales price. In particular, to use the valuation data for our purposes, 
we need to test that the irrigation variable provides no extra information over and 
above the valuation variable in predicting a farm’s sale price. (If the contrary were 
the case, the valuation data would be shown to inadequately account for the 
irrigation benefits that purchasers are prepared to pay for.) 
Longitudinal consents data (at the level of the individual farm) include 
consent type (e.g. ground water obtained from a bore as opposed to diverted 
surface water), consent dates (beginning and ending), a measure of irrigated area, 
and two measures of maximum allowable water flow; these data vary over time 
for certain properties. Other farm-specific explanatory variables include: land 
area; measures of average rainfall, slope and drainage; distance from local towns, 
plus a location variable within small defined statistical areas (‘meshblocks’). 
Variables that are not farm-specific include a measure of climatic developments 
(the southern oscillation index). The variability in the longitudinal consents data 
both cross-sectionally and over time enables us to identify the impact of the water 
consents on property prices, reflecting the implicit market valuation of water 
rights.  
We use panel estimation methods to estimate these values. Specifically, 
we estimate sales prices (and property values) as a function of a range of 
explanatory variables including the water consent variables. The consent terms are 
interacted with other explanatory variables to determine how the value of water 
consents varies according to variations in other conditions. Our methods therefore 
enable us both to determine a shadow price for water in the region and to isolate 
key determinants that affect the price. We find that flatter areas and areas with 
                                                           
 
3 poorly draining soils benefit most from irrigation, possibly because the water is 
retained for longer on these properties. Drier areas appear to benefit more from 
irrigation than do areas with higher rainfall. Farms that are situated close to towns 
derive especially strong benefits from irrigation since these properties are most 
likely to have potential water-intensive land uses such as dairying and cropping 
that require access to processing facilities and/or an urban labour pool. Differing 
returns across properties with different characteristics indicate that the legal 
restriction that forbids trading of water most probably results in allocative 
inefficiency for this resource.
5  These results provide valuable information for 
irrigation and water planning in New Zealand. The paper’s methods, especially in 
bringing together a comprehensive range of farm-specific data covering a whole 
region over a significant timespan, can also inform studies of the value of water in 
other settings where water is a scarce commodity. 
To provide a background for the analysis, section 2 outlines the (few) 
other studies internationally that have examined similar issues. Section 3 builds on 
these contributions to construct a theoretical model that underpins our empirical 
analysis. In section 4, we describe our data which have been compiled from a 
number of separate sources, each collated to match at an individual property level. 
We test whether the valuation data (covering the universe of properties) is a 
reasonable proxy for the sale price (i.e. market) data, noting that the latter is 
inherently available only for a selective portion of properties. Included in this 
section (and accompanying data appendix) is a test of whether properties with 
irrigation are more or less prone to be purchased.   
Our major results are contained in section 5. For each dataset (i.e. sale 
price dataset and valuation dataset) we have separate samples - ‘large’ and 
‘small’. In each case the ‘small’ dataset excludes lifestyle blocks
6 and some other 
properties for which land use is uncertain. The large datasets include some data 
considered reliable but where we could not be completely certain of its veracity 
(e.g. because of missing land use data used to identify whether the property is 
                                                           
5 We say “most probably” here since our results apply to the total (or average) benefit of the water 
right to the farm rather than to its marginal benefit. However since water is positively valued and 
cannot be traded, it is highly likely that differing average benefits also translate into differing 
marginal returns to water. 
6 Lifestyle blocks are small-holdings that may or may not be used for genuine farming activities. 
4 used for agricultural purposes or not), but they have the advantages of fewer 
selection issues and greater degrees of freedom. We test the robustness of our 
results across the four datasets, with different equation specifications. In 
particular, we pay attention to the nature of our controls, and estimate with and 
without (two types of) area fixed effects. At the close of section 5 we interpret our 
results, using our estimates to determine the value (in 2006) placed on irrigated 
water in different farming circumstances. Section 6 concludes, suggesting both 
research and policy implications of our findings.  
 
2 Prior  studies 
Methods for valuing irrigation water traditionally include observing water 
rights markets, residual methods, and hedonics. Transactions between buyers and 
sellers of water rights naturally are a useful source of information for valuing 
water; however lack of data means this method is rare. Residual methods derive 
shadow prices from models of decisions made by firms and households. The 
residual method, as applied to irrigation, often takes the form of farm budget or 
cost and return analysis (Young, 2005). This method involves pricing inputs and 
outputs and specifying an appropriate farm production function.  
An alternative method, and the method used in this work, uses statistical 
analyses of farm sales prices or valuation data to isolate the net economic 
contribution of irrigation water. This is an example of the hedonic property value 
approach to water valuation (Palmquist, 1989). In it, a land sales price represents 
the market’s willingness to pay for a bundle of rights to the land and irrigation 
water. Appropriate data allow the contribution of irrigation water to be 
statistically isolated from that of the land and other features such as proximity to 
urban markets, soil quality, and presence of capital items such as farm buildings. 
Despite its attractiveness, relatively few studies have applied the hedonic method 
to irrigation, and those that do frequently use small samples or suffer from some 
data deficiency, resulting in statistically insignificant results. 
Studies using hedonic valuation methods include Crouter (1987), Torell et 
al (1990), Xu et al. (1993) and Faux and Perry (1999). Crouter (1987) examined 
53 observations of farm sales in Colorado from 1970 but was unable to find a 
5 statistically significant effect of irrigation water rights on farm sales price. Torell 
et al (1990) examined a much larger sample of 7,200 farm sales in a six state 
region in the Ogallala aquifer in the western United States from 1979-1985. 
Following Palmquist (1989) they estimate two equations, one for dry land and one 
for irrigated land, and find that the price differential between the two types of land 
has declined over time. They estimated values of about $3.90 per acre-foot of 
water in storage over the entire region, with values ranging from $1.09/acre-foot 
in Oklahoma in 1986 to $9.50 per acre-foot in 1983 in New Mexico (an arid 
state). These estimates suggested that the water value component of irrigated farm 
sales ranged from 30 to 60 percent of the farm sale price. 
Xu et al (1993) study the effects of site characteristics on the valuation of 
agricultural land between 1980 and 1987 in Washington State. They find a 
positive and significant effect of irrigation and also find that the type of water 
distribution system is important, a central pivot system being more valuable than 
other sprinkler systems.  
Faux and Perry (1999) apply the hedonic method to a sample of 225 farm 
sales in Malheur County, Oregon between 1991 and 1995.
7 They put considerable 
effort into evaluating the effect of soil quality on farm land prices. Their research 
assumes a constant 2.5 acre-feet per acre rate of irrigation across all sales to allow 
them to derive a value per unit of water volume. Their estimates of this value 
ranged from $9 to $44 for the lowest to highest quality irrigated soils.  
Young (2005) reviews a variety of methodological approaches to valuing 
irrigation water, and notes that estimates of the value of irrigation water from 
hedonic estimates tend to be much lower than those derived from residual 
methods. Torell et al. (1990) compared their hedonic valuations with valuations 
derived from farm budgeting (residual) methods. They found that their hedonic 
results were much smaller (in $ per acre-foot) than those derived from residual 
methods. This could be because many residual estimates are short-run and ignore 
some fixed costs. Another reason for relatively low hedonic estimates might be 
the choice to exclude non-irrigated land sales (Young, 2005). If all observations 
                                                           
7 Young (2005) describes Faux and Perry as a quasi-hedonic approach because they lack data on 
the quantity of the water right for each property. 
6 represent sales of irrigated land, the range of water supplies across observations is 
likely to be limited, and relatively little change in output per unit of water input 
would be expected. Young (2005) also suggests that the hedonic method measures 
an at-source (or water cost-adjusted) value rather than the at-site measure usually 
derived by residual methods. To make the two approaches comparable, the 
estimated costs of obtaining water need to be accounted for in each approach.  
Given Young’s analysis, successful use of the hedonic approach requires a 
location where both irrigated and non-irrigated land parcels of relatively similar 
climate and market conditions are bought and sold on competitive markets. The 
observations on the extent of the water right must also vary widely enough for a 
satisfactory statistical estimate. Our comprehensive data sources enable us to meet 
these requirements. 
In New Zealand, little econometric research has been conducted on the 
value of irrigation, despite an estimated doubling in irrigated area between 1985 
and 1995 (Ministry for the Environment, 2000). At a macroeconomic scale, the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) (2004) calculated that the 
contribution of irrigation water to GDP was $920 million in 2002/03, or 
approximately 11% of farmgate GDP. An adjusted gross margin method was used 
to estimate the change in GDP generated by irrigation.
8  
Two community schemes (Waimakariri and Opuha) have been developed 
during this period. The Opuha dam was the subject of an ex post study by Harris 
et al (2006). They examined the effect of the Opuha dam, commissioned in 1999, 
on the local Canterbury economy. The study was conducted over a two-year 
period (2002/03-2003/04) and used detailed revenue and expenditure data from a 
final sample of 32 irrigated farms and 20 dry-land properties. The authors 
estimated total revenue (for the two year period) was $2,073/ha for irrigated farms 
compared to $862/ha for dry-land farms. 
Ford (2002) conducted an ex post study of the Lower Waitaki irrigation 
scheme, assessing a wide range of commercial, economic and social parameters. 
He compared the scheme with economic and social changes in the (otherwise 
                                                           
8 A gross margin is the total revenue associated with a particular production minus costs, adjusted 
to take account of differences in overheads between land uses and also for wages and salaries. 
7 similar) Rangitata area which does not have a community irrigation scheme. Farm 
output models of income, expenditure, and land use were created using data on 
typical farm budgets and from a comprehensive agricultural database (Agribase) 
for both irrigated and dry-land farms. Ford compared the two regions over a 
period of 20 years and found considerable differences in population, income and 
employment. The net change in annual cash farm surplus from switching from 
dry-land to having an irrigation scheme is $29 million per annum, representing a 
14.1 percent return on capital at the farm gate. The Waitaki regions had a net 




We adopt an hedonic approach to valuing farms in relation to their 
fundamental characteristics [Palmquist (1989); Palmquist & Danielson (1989); 
Freeman (2003); Taylor (2003)]. Our approach incorporates a  semi-log functional 
form, appropriate for minimising potential heteroskedasticity (Rosen, 1974). 
Let Yijt be real net income
9 (including returns to capital) accruing to the 
owner of farm i (“the farmer”) at time t when the farm is used to produce 
commodity j (j=1,…,n); for instance, j could represent arable output, sheepmeat, 
or dairy produce. Nominal net income is given by Pjt*Yijt where Pjt is the market 
price for commodity j at time t. For any j we assume that real net income is 
determined both by land area, Lijt, (subject to scale parameter, α) and by 
productivity per hectare, Aijt (after adjusting for scale); thus: 
Pjt*Yijt = Pjt*Lijt
α *Aijt                     (1) 
Productivity is a function, in part, of land characteristics that cannot easily 
be changed; these include climate (rainfall), soil structure (drainage), and terrain 
(slope). It may also be a function of location (e.g. distance from towns) and of 
human modification, notably irrigation. Furthermore, there is likely to be an 
interaction between irrigation and the innate characteristics of the land. For 
                                                           
 
9 This approach implies that the costs of bringing water to the point of use have already been 
deducted in forming the net income variable.  
8 instance, we hypothesise that irrigation will be more important to farm 
productivity where a unit has low rainfall than in a situation where a unit already 
has plentiful rainwater. Similarly, irrigation may be more or less effective in units 
with different slope, drainage and location characteristics.  
Denoting the vector of farm i’s characteristics (which are assumed 
unchanged across all t) as Zi and letting Wit be a measure for farm i’s irrigation at 
time t, we assume that Aijt is determined as in (2): 
lnAijt = k + f(Zi) + g(Wit) + h(Zi*Wit) + εijt               (2) 
where f(.), g(.) and h(.) are functions to be specified, k is a constant and εijt is a 
residual term that is uncorrelated with all other explanatory variables. Combining 
(1) and (2) yields: 
Pjt*Yijt = Pjt*Lijt
α *exp{ ki + f(Zi) + g(Wit) + h(Zi*Wit) + εijt }           (3) 
For each property i (given its existing characteristics), the farmer chooses 
an optimal land use, j*, in time t such that Pjt*Yijt|j=j* = sup(Pjt*Yijt|j=1,…,n) to give 
net income Πit.
10      
The market value (MVit) of farm i in year t is given by the present 
discounted value of net income from the property. If, in period t, net income is 
expected to grow at exponential rate ϕt and the discount rate is expected to be 
constant at rate rt, MVit will be given by the standard formula for an infinite 
series: 
MVit = Πit*(1+rt)/(rt-ϕt)                   (4) 
Combining (4) with (3), and taking logarithms, we obtain: 
lnMVit = k +αlnLi +f(Zi)+g(Wit)+h(Zi*Wit)+{lnP+ln(1+r)/(r-ϕ)}t +εit       (5) 
In (5), the term in braces is not farm-specific so in a panel application it 
can be proxied by year fixed effects. In our empirical work, we employ linear 
functions for each of f(.), g(.) and h(.).
11  
                                                           
 
10 Henceforth we drop the j subscript, assuming that all land is devoted to the optimal land use. 
Accordingly, we also drop the t subscript for land, since each farm has constant land area through 
the sample. 
9 One issue that we have to deal with is the potential endogeneity of 
irrigation decisions; for example, irrigation may only be applied to land with 
certain characteristics. For example, less productive land may require greater 
irrigation; alternatively, farmers may choose to irrigate inherently more 
productive land. These possibilities make it particularly important that we control 
for the underlying characteristics of the farm in our estimation.
12  
We take a number of different approaches in controlling for farm 
characteristics. First, we account for the characteristics explicitly, controlling for 
each farm’s average rainfall, slope, drainage and location, as well as its land area. 
Location is proxied in two different ways: (a) by the distance of the farm centroid 
to both the nearest town and nearest city; and (b) by use of ‘meshblock’ fixed 
effects, where a meshblock is a Statistics New Zealand small area definition; in 
rural areas, this normally comprises a collection of properties with a population of 
approximately 60 people. We are able to apply these controls consistently across 
both the sales price and valuation datasets. An even more comprehensive 
approach to controlling for farm characteristics uses farm fixed effects. We have 
close to a balanced sample for the valuation dataset and so can apply farm fixed 
effects in place of all terms in (5) that solely have an i subscript. This is a key 
reason that we use the valuation data in addition to the sales price data as a 
dependent variable. We cannot adopt the farm fixed effects approach for the sales 
price dataset since there are very few repeat sales over the relevant time period. 
By estimating (5) for both definitions of MVit, we are able to test robustness of 
results across our two data sources, one explicitly market-based (sales price) and 
one comprehensive (valuation). 
The theoretical specification leading to (5) implies that certain 
macroeconomic variables may impact on all farm prices and so be reflected in the 
year fixed effects. The value of irrigation that is impounded into the farm price 
should not vary over and above these macroeconomic impacts. For instance, 
temporary developments in general climatic conditions (e.g. recent drought 
                                                           
11 In earlier work, we tested the impact of quadratic terms but found that the minor extra 
explanatory power did not compensate for the added complexity. 
12 As described subsequently, we control for farm characteristics using a number of approaches. 
We do not have additional variables over and above these farm characteristics variables that we 
can use as instruments; thus we do not adopt an instrumental variables or GMM estimator.  
10 experience) should not impact materially on the present discounted value of 
irrigation. This is a testable hypothesis. We interact the irrigation variable with an 
annual climate variable to test whether farmers’ valuations of irrigation are 
affected by short-term developments, possibly reflecting behaviourally-based 
considerations.
13  
The equations that we estimate are specified explicitly in section 5. Prior 
to doing so, section 4 discusses the nature of the variables and our data sources. 
 
4 Data 
4.1  Sale Price and Valuation data 
We use unit record sales price, valuation and resource consent data for the 
Mackenzie District from 1988 to 2006. The sales price and valuation data are 
sourced from Quotable Value New Zealand (QVNZ) a state-owned enterprise. 
QVNZ collates all property sales data across New Zealand and also collates and 
undertakes valuation of properties for property tax (rating) purposes.  
The valuation dataset contains the valuation date, capital value, land value 
(henceforth denoted VALUATION), improved value, land type,
14 and land area 
(henceforth denoted LAND) of all rural properties in the Mackenzie District, 
Canterbury, in the South Island of New Zealand. The dataset also contains a Land 
Information New Zealand (LINZ) identification number that allows us to map the 
property boundaries using GIS.
15  Valuations are conducted on a three-yearly 
cycle; we have seven waves from 1988 to 2006.  
                                                           
13 Similarly, we have tested a specification in which the irrigation variable is interacted with a 
mortgage interest rate variable and with relevant commodity price indices to test whether irrigation 
is valued more highly when interest rates decline and/or when commodity prices rise. We find no 
evidence to support these alternative hypotheses. Nor do we find evidence that the type of water 
right (surface versus ground water, for instance) affects the value of the consent. For brevity, we 
omit the specifications testing these additional issues from the paper.  
14 However the land type data is substantially incomplete. 
15 In 2006 there were 1,252 currently active rural properties in the Mackenzie District. However 56 
properties are without a LINZ number and therefore cannot be mapped or spatially merged with 
the resource consent data. 
11 Significant cleaning of the data was undertaken.
16 One important situation 
is where a property is subdivided. In this case it is possible to aggregate properties 
that have been subdivided to form the previous property, thereby allowing us to 
form a continuous series for each (aggregated) property. Of the 1,169 properties in 
2006, 645 are the result of subdivision. After aggregating these subdivisions we 
are left with 695 properties covering 1988-2006. Most of these properties have 
data for every valuation wave, but some properties have missing data, resulting in 
3,951 usable observations. Thus we have a panel that is mostly, but not 
completely, balanced. 
Due to incomplete land use data, we form two valuation samples for 
estimation. The first (larger sample with all 3,951 observations) is formed on the 
basis of land use in 1988 and includes all agricultural categories in addition to 
properties with a missing land use code in 1988. Table 1 presents a summary of 
the main variables in this sample. The second sample excludes all properties that 
had a missing land use code in 1988, reducing the sample to 2,702 observations.
17  
For market sales, we use QVNZ annual sales data for the Mackenzie 
District from 1988-2006. The dataset includes the sales date, sales price, and land 
type, of all rural properties sold in the Mackenzie District. Two main samples are 
formed based on land use.
18 The first sample includes all agricultural properties, 
plus properties coded as lifestyle properties, and properties with no land use code. 
The second sample excludes sales of lifestyle properties and those with a missing 
land use code.  
The sales price of a property includes the value of improvements as well as 
the value of land (i.e. capital value equals improvement value plus land value). 
For each property, we have the QVNZ valuation of improvements at the most 
                                                           
16 One reason for doing so is where there are multiple observations for the same property in the 
same year. This may occur when a change to the property occurs between regular valuations, for 
example because of major renovation work, and the property is revalued. The exact date of the 
revaluation is unknown; in these cases the first record (using the date stamp by which the data was 
exported by QVNZ) is kept. Any valuation changes are picked up in the next regular valuation. 
17 Both the valuation and consent data are aggregated to economic units, as this is the basis on 
which valuations are conducted. For example a farm may be divided into several parcels with 
different legal ownership, but may be operated as a single farm, thus ‘property’ refers to the 
economic unit not the legal land parcel as defined by LINZ. 
18 Land use data for the sales dataset is substantially complete in comparison to the valuation data; 
only 75 sales have no land use code out of 1,366 sales. 
12 recent triennial valuation cycle. We interpolate the improvement value between 
any two valuation cycles by applying a constant growth rate to improvements 
during that three year period to obtain an estimate of improvement value annually 
for each property. We subtract the improvement value from the sales price to 
derive a sales price based land value (since land value is the variable that we 
require in order to assess the value attributed to the hedonic variables, including 
irrigation).
19 We denote the resulting variable: SALESPRICE. 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the larger sales price sample. The 
mean of each variable in the sales price dataset (Table 2) is within one standard 
deviation of the respective mean for the valuation dataset (using the standard 
deviations from the valuation dataset, which can be considered the ‘universe’ in 
this application). Thus there is no evidence here that the sales dataset suffers from 
material selection bias.  
We also test for selection bias in the sales price dataset by estimating a 
probit equation explaining the probability of sale for any property (within the 
valuation dataset) in any year. We include only properties that have not been 
subdivided (or aggregated) during the period 1988-2006 to ensure a sample with 
consistent characteristics over time. Within this restricted set of properties, we 
again have two samples: the first includes lifestyle blocks and properties with 
missing land use codes, and the second excludes them. Results of the probit 
equations are reported in the Data Appendix. Consistent with the comparison of 
data means, the results indicate that the sales samples are representative of the 
universe of properties in the region. Crucially, there is no evidence that the 
presence of irrigation alters the propensity of a property to be sold. 
Use of sales price as dependent variable has the positive feature that 
market prices are used in the hedonic valuation of irrigation. However the sales 
price samples are smaller than the valuation universe; the valuation data have the 
advantage of comprehensive coverage that also enables use of farm fixed effects. 
                                                           
 
19 Of the 1,304 sales, we can only form the interpolated improvement values for 695 properties, 
since it is not always possible to match every sale with the appropriate improvements data when a 
sale of a subdivided property has occurred and where we have aggregated that subdivided property 
back to its pre-subdivision status. In addition we drop some sales (primarily lifestyle blocks) where 
the ratio of improvement value to sales price is greater than 0.9 (leaving virtually zero, or negative, 
implied land value). This leaves us with a sample of 678 sales (in the larger sales sample). 
13 The key potential concern with using valuation data is that the usefulness of the 
data relies on the accuracy of the valuation process. Accuracy in valuing the 
present discounted value of net benefits derived from irrigation is of particular 
importance.
20 It is conceivable, for instance, that valuers may not be fully aware 
of the extent of a property’s water consents and hence of its actual or potential 
irrigation characteristics.  
In the Data Appendix, we test whether the valuation data are an unbiased 
predictor of sales prices for properties sold in the region within the sample period. 
In addition, we test whether any of the farm characteristics variables helps predict 
sales prices over and above the influence of the property valuation. We find that 
land area provides some extra predictive power, contrary to the unbiasedness 
hypothesis. In the largest sample, the irrigation variable (RATE) has a positive 
coefficient with a t-value of 1.339 (significant at 10% on a 1-tailed test), but it is 
not significant at conventional levels for the remaining samples. This evidence 
indicates that the property valuation data is a reasonable proxy for market value in 
many cases, but some care must be taken with the valuation-based results since 
the data are not completely accurate indicators of actual farm market value and 
may possibly understate the value of irrigation.  
 
4.2  Resource consent data 
The second source of data is the Canterbury regional council, Environment 
Canterbury, which provided details of all irrigation resource consents issued in the 
Mackenzie District. There are four types of irrigation consents, respectively for 
surface water, surface divert, ground water and consents for dams.
21 Surface water 
consents refer to situations where water is drawn directly from a river or lake, 
surface divert consents refers to situations where a watercourse has been altered. 
Ground water consents are required for extracting water from underground 
                                                           
 
20 Valuations are legally required to reflect the estimated market value of the property; use is made 
of information from sales of like properties in the area. Thus valuers implicitly conduct an hedonic 
valuation of the property, but there is no explicit formula for the conduct of such valuations. 
21 All data were provided in the form of point data in ArcGIS shapefiles. 
14 aquifers. Dam consents are for generally small private dams that have been built 
to store water.
22  
Available data include the start and end date of the consent, the maximum 
legal rate of water extraction in litres per second and cubic metres per day, the 
irrigated area and property area. For our empirical work we form three variables 
from these irrigation data: irrigated area/property area (IRRIG), maximum legal 
rate of water extraction in litres per second/property area (RATE) and maximum 
legal rate of water extraction in cubic metres per day/property area (VOL).
23, 
24  
The spatial distribution of consents over the period 1988-2006 is shown in 
Figure 1. There is significant variation in the extent of the water right across 
different properties. On average, irrigated properties are allowed a maximum 
extraction rate of 100 litres per second (l/s), ranging from 0.4 l/s to 4,000 l/s (with 
a standard deviation of 101 l/s). Similarly the average maximum volume is 22,335 
cubic metres per day, ranging from 65 m
3/day to 345,600 m
3/day (with a standard 
deviation of 22,561 m
3/day). 
Tables 1 and 2 present information on the prevalence of consents across 
our large valuation and sales price datasets. In 1988, 2.7% of farms (19/695) in the 
valuation dataset had a water right; this proportion had increased to 9.1% by 2006. 
For the sales price sample, 13.6% of sales (97 properties) over the 1988-2006 
period involved sale of a farm with a water right. Thus, while most properties do 
not have legal access to irrigated water, both datasets provide a material number 
of properties both with and without consents. 
 
                                                           
22 We do not directly incorporate the dam consents in our work, but instead indirectly include their 
impact where water is drawn from the resulting reservoir by way of a surface consent.  
23 These data also required cleaning. Some consents were geocoded outside a property boundary so 
the consent cannot be linked with the valuation data. Generally these cases relate to consents that 
are for local council water supply or similar. Some consents lacked any date information rendering 
these consents unusable. The majority of these are consents for which after initial investigation, no 
consent was sought or the application was withdrawn. For a few consents without date information 
it was possible to get this information from the Environment Canterbury online consent search 
tool. For properties with more than one consent the water right variables are aggregated; irrigated 
area is summed, and the rate of extraction and volume is averaged (weighted by the irrigated area). 
24 Grimes and Aitken (2008), in an early version of this paper, report equations including IRRIG, 
RATE and VOL respectively. Each of the variables is consistently positive across all equations; 
however RATE had greater explanatory power than did either IRRIG or VOL, and we restrict our 
attention here solely to the RATE results.  
15 4.3  Location, land characteristics and climate variables 
GIS was used to compute the distance between the centroids of every 
property and four towns: Fairlie, Geraldine, Temuka, and Timaru. Two variables 
were created, one for the distance from each property centroid to the nearest town 
(DIST1) and another for the distance from each property centroid to Timaru, a 
port and rail city with a population of 27,000 in 2001 (DIST2). All distances are 
straight line distances measured in metres.  
We use additional data, sourced from Landcare Research (Land 
Environments of New Zealand) that characterizes natural features of each farm 
unit, such as average rainfall (RAIN), average slope (SLOPE) and soil drainage 
(DRAIN).
25 Figure 2 shows the distribution of average rainfall (mm) across the 
Mackenzie District. Figure 3 shows the average slope (degrees) across the district 
for each property, and Figure 4 shows the average soil drainage measure across 
each property.
26   
New Zealand agricultural production is significantly affected by the 
presence or absence of drought influenced by El Niño and La Niña weather cycles 
(Buckle et al, 2002). The Southern Oscillation Index (SOI) provides a measure of 
these weather cycles.
27 We interact our irrigation variable with the current and 
one-year lagged SOI to test whether cyclical weather patterns affect the net 
present value that farmers attribute to irrigation.
28  
 
                                                           
25 The data is in raster form in GIS layers and is averaged and merged onto the property boundary 
layer. 
26 This ranges from very poor, where the soil has pale colours due to water-logging in the horizon 
immediately below the top layer; to good, where there is a lack of any significant mottling or pale 
colours. Moderately drained soil has some pale mottled colours due to water-logging at lower 
depths in the subsoil. 
27 The SOI is calculated from the pressure difference between Tahiti and Darwin. Anomalously 
low values of this index correspond to El Niño conditions (with tendency to drought in 
Canterbury), while anomalously high SOI values are called La Niña episodes. El Niño events 
occur about 3 to 7 years apart (source of text and data: National Institute of Weather and 
Atmospheric Research, NIWA). 
28 If there is any tendency to extrapolate cyclical weather patterns into perceived long-term trends, 
one would expect a negative coefficient on this interaction term as farmers raise their valuation of 
irrigation during drought times (low SOI). 
16 5  Models, Estimation Methods and Results 
5.1  Models and Estimation Methods 
We estimate two variants of equation (5) for the sales price datasets and 
three variants for the valuation datasets; the variants differ by their treatment of 
controls for location and area fixed effects. For each sample, an initial equation is 
estimated incorporating explicit controls for farm-specific characteristics 
(lnLANDi, RAINi, SLOPEi, DRAINi, DIST1i, DIST2i)
29 but without any form of 
area fixed effects (time fixed effects, τt, are included in each equation). The 
irrigation variable (RATEit) is included by itself and is interacted with each of the 
farm characteristics variables
30 in order to test whether irrigation is more valuable 
in some circumstances than others. RATE is also interacted with current and 
lagged climate (SOIt) to test for possible short-term re-evaluations of the value of 
irrigation driven by climatic cycles. The residual term for the initial equation is 
shown as (7), i.e. with time fixed effects but no area fixed effects. 
 
  lnMVit =  β0 + β1RATEit + β2 RATEit*SOIt + β3RATEit*SOIt-1 +  
β4RATEit*RAINi + β5RATEit*SLOPEi + β6RATEit*DRAINi +  
β7RATEit*DIST1i + β8RATEit*DIST2i + β9lnLANDi + β10RAINi + 
β11SLOPEi + β12DRAINi + β13DIST1i + β14DIST2i + εit            (6) 
                         
          εit = τt + εit’            (7) 
A variant of this specification is estimated for all four samples in which 
meshblock fixed effects (λm) are included in place of the two distance variables. 
Thus, in this variant, εit is modelled as in (8), and β13 = β14 = 0 in (6).        
          εit = τt + λm + εit’ ’            (8) 
Finally, for the valuation datasets, a variant is estimated in which farm  
fixed effects (λi) are included in place of all farm-specific variables. In this 
                                                           
29 See Tables 1 and 2 for variable definitions. MV (market value) is proxied variously by 
VALUATION and by SALESPRICE. 
30 Other than lnLAND; RATE is already expressed as a ratio of land area. 
17 variant, εit is modelled as in (9), and β9 = β10 = β11 = β12 = β13 = β14 = 0 in (6). 
                    
          εit = τt + λi + εit’’’                     (9) 
These three variants include increasingly strict controls for farm 
characteristics, with stricter controls reducing the potential for the results to be 
driven by reverse causality, i.e. by irrigation being located in inherently more or 
less productive (valuable) areas.
31  In interpreting the results from (6) - for all of 
the error specifications - it is important to recognise, as we do in our discussion in 
section 5.4, that the overall coefficient on RATE varies by farm characteristics (as 
well as climatic conditions), being given by: 
 
β1+β2SOIt+β3SOIt-1+β4RAINi+β5SLOPEi+β6DRAINi+β7DIST1i+β8DIST2i     (10) 
 
Initial estimation was conducted using OLS. Breusch-Pagan and White 
tests and plots of residuals indicated the presence of heteroskedasticity, with a 
negative relationship between residuals and fitted vales of both the sales price and 
valuation variables. Accordingly we estimate all equations using GLS. In the 
(unbalanced) sales price samples, the GLS estimator accounts for 
heteroskedasticity; in the (mostly balanced) valuation samples, the GLS estimator 
accounts for both heteroskedasticity and AR(1) errors.
32  One feature of GLS 
(given the weighted estimation) is that there is no standard summary statistic for 
‘goodness of fit’. As an indication, we provide the R
2 statistic and root mean 
square error (RMSE) obtained from the corresponding OLS estimate of the same 
equation. 
 
                                                           
31 The use of farm fixed effects (which can be adopted only for the valuation samples) is identical 
to a difference in differences specification at the farm level. 
32 Estimates of each equation using OLS, variously with robust standard errors and with clustered 
standard errors (where the clustering is on meshblocks) yields qualitatively similar results to those 
using GLS and so are not reported separately.  
18 5.2  Sales price results 
Table 3 presents the estimates for the first two variants of (6) using the two 
sales price samples (i.e. the ‘large’ sample that includes lifestyle properties and 
properties with no land use code, and the ‘small’ sample that excludes these 
properties). In both cases, sales cover the period 1988 - 2006. 
All four sets of estimates provide strong support for a significant effect of 
irrigation on farm sales prices; they also indicate that the impact of irrigation is 
moderated by other factors. The raw (uninteracted) coefficient on RATE is 
positive and significant at the 1% level in each equation; the coefficient on 
RATE*DRAIN is negative and significantly different from zero at the 1% level in 
three equations and is significant at 5% in the fourth. Farms that are close to town 
(i.e. a low value for DIST1) benefit more from irrigation than do those more 
distant suggesting that proximity to processing facilities situated in town (e.g. 
dairy factory, packing house, coolstores, etc) or to an urban labour pool is 
beneficial for water-intensive (horticulture and dairy) land uses. The large sample 
equation lends support also to the intuitive expectation that flatter farms with low 
rainfall benefit more from irrigation than do hillier, high rainfall farms. 
There is no support for the idea that irrigation is valued more or less highly 
depending on recent climatic experiences (i.e. the coefficients on current and 
lagged RATE*SOI are not significantly different from zero in the large sample, 
while the sum of the two coefficients is positive in the small sample, contrary to 
the extrapolation explanation). The raw farm characteristics variables indicate that 
farm value increases with size but with an elasticity of less than one, possibly 
reflecting the tendency for larger farms to be devoted to less intensive land uses 
such as sheep and beef (relative to horticulture and dairying). Hill country land 
(high slope and high rainfall) tends to be valued at lower rates than flat country 
land. Location near to the main port and rail-head (Timaru) is important with 
values declining as distance from Timaru increases.  
Incorporation of meshblock fixed effects provides greater explanatory 
power than does use of the two distance variables. Perhaps surprisingly, root mean 
squared errors are smaller for the ‘large’ sample than for the ‘small’ sample, even 
though the former is at greater risk of contamination through possible 
19 incorporation of inappropriate properties. Our preferred equation for the sales data 
is therefore the ‘large’ sample equation incorporating meshblock fixed effects. 
 
5.3 Valuation  results 
Table 4 presents the estimates for all three variants of (6) using the two 
valuation samples. Each panel estimate is conducted at three yearly intervals from 
1988 – 2006 (i.e. seven waves), coinciding with the years in which the valuations 
are conducted. In both samples, the equation with farm fixed effects shows a 
stronger impact on farm values from the raw RATE variable than occurs in the 
equations without farm fixed effects. This is consistent with an hypothesis that 
farms that are more in need of irrigation (and hence with lower values in the 
absence of irrigation) are those that adopt irrigation. Controlling for local 
characteristics through farm fixed effects captures such factors more accurately 
than the other two methods (hence the lower RMSEs), contributing to the greater 
significance of RATE in this specification.  
There is again strong support in the farm fixed effects equations for 
significant interactions of irrigation with both slope and drainage, and with 
proximity to town. The large sample farm fixed effects equation lends some 
support for the hypothesis that farms with high rainfall benefit less from irrigation 
than do inherently drier farms. 
The meshblock fixed effects equation is consistent with the corresponding 
sales price equation, finding that farm value increases with land area (but again 
with an elasticity less than one); land with hill country characteristics (especially 
high slope) is valued less than other land. Consistent with sales price estimates, 
the equation without any area fixed effects indicates that farm values decline as 
distance from the main city and transport link increase. 
The qualitative consistency in results between the two different data 
sources for market values is reassuring, given that they have been obtained in 
quite different manners (directly observed market prices versus officially assessed 
valuations). Conceptually we prefer the sales price data, but only valuation data 
permits use of farm fixed effects. Importantly, in both valuation samples, the 
results using this technique point to an increased value for the coefficient on 
20 RATE than is obtained from the other two techniques. Accordingly, the valuation 
estimates imply that there is no reason to infer that the sales price results over-
state the effect of irrigation due to insufficient farm-level controls.  
 
5.4  Magnitudes of Irrigation Effects 
The econometric estimates indicate that the right to extract irrigated water 
has a significant effect on farm values within the study area. We turn attention to 
the magnitudes of these effects for different types of farms. These effects reflect 
the net benefit of water rights to the farmer (i.e. to the farm’s present discounted 
returns after subtracting costs associated with accessing the water, capital 
payments on irrigation infrastructure, etc).
33   
As indicated in Tables 1 and 2, the large majority of farms in the region do 
not have a legal right to extract either surface or ground water. For many farms, 
the net returns to investing in an irrigation project will be negative and hence there 
is no incentive to apply for a water right. Other farms may anticipate irrigation to 
be of net benefit, but have no water right owing to the first-come first-served 
allocation mechanism.  
Table 5 illustrates how differing farm characteristics impact on the return 
to a water right, as reflected in the ‘irrigation premium’ pertaining to the farm’s 
market value (MV). The irrigation premium is defined for a farm with 
characteristics Z and RATE=R expressed relative to a baseline case where 
RATE=0 for the same farm; i.e.: 
Irrigation Premium = MV(R,Z) / MV(0,Z) – 1         (11) 
In calculating MV(R,Z), we use two estimates. First, we utilise the large 
sample valuation equation with farm fixed effects; this equation incorporates the 
strictest controls. Its drawback is that it uses valuation rather than sales price data, 
with the former potentially understating the irrigation premium. Second, we utilise 
the sales price equation with meshblock fixed effects. These estimates are based 
                                                           
33 Gross returns to irrigation may be higher; however net return is the relevant economic measure 
since the value of resources used to extract the water must be taken into account. The ability of the 
hedonic method to capture the impact of irrigation on net (rather than gross) returns is one 
advantage of this methodology. 
21 on observed market prices paid for farms but have meshblock fixed effects rather 
than farm fixed effects, so not being able to control as carefully for farm 
characteristics (and hence for potential reverse causality). For each equation, the 
overall coefficient on RATE is summarised in (10) for any vector of elements in 
Z. We examine five separate cases in which we vary these elements and vary 
RATE to demonstrate how the value attributed to a water right may vary in 
response to farm characteristics and the maximum allowable flow rate.   
Our baseline case (first row of Table 5) sets R equal to the mean water 
right for properties that have RATE>0 (for each sample) and sets all elements of Z 
to their respective sample means. The valuation equation indicates virtually a zero 
irrigation premium in this case, while the sales price equation indicates a negative 
premium. The lack of a material positive premium when each farm characteristic 
is held at its mean is consistent with the observed fact that only a minority of 
farms have invested in irrigation schemes within the region. 
The second case sets the value for soil drainage to one standard deviation 
below the mean for each sample (while holding all other variables at their mean). 
A positive premium is indicated for both samples. Positive premia are also 
indicated in cases where: the distance to the nearest town is reduced by one 
standard deviation, and where each of rainfall, slope and drainage are reduced by 
half a standard deviation. In the latter case, we illustrate the importance of the 
magnitude of the water right by initially calculating the premium for the mean 
water right, and then for a right with RATE at double its mean value.
34  
In each non-baseline case, the premium indicated by the sales price 
equation is between two and five times that indicated by the valuation equation. 
As noted above, the valuation equation may understate the premium if valuers are 
not fully aware of the positive net returns attached to the water right. Conversely, 
there is potential for the premia based on the sales price equation to be overstated 
in certain circumstances if farm characteristics are not adequately captured by the 
meshblock fixed effects. Thus the two columns present a plausible lower and 
upper bound for the irrigation premium in each case. 
                                                           
34 The mean value of the water right in each case is approximately one third of its standard 
deviation, so many properties will have even higher values of the water right. 
22  
6 Conclusions 
Water is a crucial input into agricultural production. In areas where the 
demand for (free) water exceeds the available supply, some form of allocation 
mechanism is required. This may be through a “first-come first-served” approach, 
but such an approach by itself is likely to be inefficient, with upstream users 
benefiting relative to those downstream. New Zealand’s Resource Management 
Act (RMA) requires potential users (including farmers) to obtain a resource 
consent to draw both surface and ground water for agricultural and other purposes. 
However this system is, to a large extent, a “first-applied first-granted” system. 
Not only is there no formal price mechanism to allocate the water, the existence of 
such a mechanism is contrary to current law. 
Water rights, under the RMA, are attached to enterprises; thus when a 
farm is sold, its water right is sold along with it. This feature, together with the 
scarcity of water in certain regions, means that not only does a positive shadow 
price for water exist but also it can be observed at the time of farm sale through 
the sale price. All properties are valued triennially by an independent body (for 
property tax purposes) and those values are required by law to reflect the current 
market value of the property. The capital valuations further split the value of each 
property into value of land and value of improvements. Thus we have two sources 
of data that we can use to extract the value of water rights after controlling for 
other features of each farm. 
We ascertain the value of irrigation by estimating the price implicitly 
placed on water (through farm sale prices and valuations) in the Mackenzie 
District, a drought-prone region of Canterbury, New Zealand. Our hedonic 
approach contrasts with previous studies in New Zealand which have used other 
methods (especially the adjusted gross margin method) to determine the value of 
irrigation for certain areas.  
Our approach also contrasts with prior hedonic studies internationally in 
several respects. First, unlike most previous studies, we have observations on all 
rural properties in the region – both with and without water rights, and (for the 
valuation database) those that are sold and not sold. This means we can avoid 
23 many of the selection issues and issues of low variation in the irrigation variable 
that have bedevilled earlier studies. Second, we have more comprehensive data 
than in most other studies, not only covering a wide range of properties, but also 
covering a nineteen year timespan. GIS techniques have enabled us to determine 
comprehensive farm-specific measures of land characteristics such as average 
slope, drainage and rainfall, as well as farm-specific measures of distance to 
towns and the nearest city which we use as controls in our equations. Third, we 
have exact measures of the water rights – and how those water rights change over 
time – for each farm over the nineteen years. The cross-sectional and time 
variation in water rights, coupled with controls for other farm characteristics 
(including meshblock and farm fixed effects) and for macroeconomic variables 
(through time fixed effects), allows us to identify the impacts of water rights on 
farm values.  
Contrary to some prior hedonic studies that have worked with less 
adequate data, we find significant impacts of irrigation on farm prices. In addition, 
irrigation has different impacts on farms with different characteristics. We find 
that flatter areas and areas with poorly draining soils benefit most from irrigation, 
possibly because the water is retained for longer on those properties. Drier areas 
appear to benefit more from irrigation than do areas with higher rainfall.  
Farms that are situated close to towns derive especially strong benefits 
from irrigation since these units are most likely to have potential water-intensive 
land uses such as dairying and cropping that require access to processing facilities 
and/or urban labour pools. In accordance with this result, farms with irrigation are, 
on average, located closer to town than farms with no irrigation (in the sales price 
dataset, mean distance to town for irrigated farms is 13.9km compared with 
29.7km for unirrigated farms).
35
Based on our estimated sales price equations, reasonable variations in the 
size of water right and of farm characteristics can give a positive irrigation 
premium of up to 50% relative to similar unirrigated properties. Estimated 
valuation-based premia are lower, at up to 15% for the same cases. The former 
estimates may overstate the irrigation premia owing to potentially incomplete 
                                                           
35 Other farm characteristics do not differ materially between irrigated and unirrigated farms. 
24 farm-based controls, while the premia may be understated by the latter estimates if 
valuers do not have sufficient information to account fully for the net benefits 
derived from irrigation. 
Our results indicate that the net return to irrigation would be negative for 
many farms (after investment costs are taken into account). This finding is 
consistent with the fact that only about one-tenth of Mackenzie District farms 
have irrigation. 
The positive net returns to irrigation found here for certain types of farm 
indicate that water, and an associated water right through a resource consent, is a 
valuable commodity in this drought-prone region. Perhaps even more importantly, 
we find that the shadow price placed on that water varies materially according to 
other characteristics. Farmers benefit more as their water right increases (i.e. as 
they have access to a greater water flow) and value the water right more highly in 
areas with certain characteristics that make them suitable for water-intensive land 
uses. 
For most commodities, agents who value that commodity highly will be 
purchasers, and those with lower valuations (who have initial ownership of the 
commodity) will be sellers. However there is no explicit market for irrigated water 
in New Zealand owing to legal restrictions. Water rights are allocated free of 
charge to certain applicants but no sale of these rights is permitted. Thus the value 
of the water is restricted to its on-site benefit, and this benefit is reflected in the 
market values of farms in the district. Nevertheless, it remains the case that the 
full value of water is not being realised since returns differ significantly according 
to farm characteristics. Thus, while irrigation is of net benefit to farms in the 
region, our findings indicate that full value from irrigation is not being achieved 
owing to the current restrictions on water trading that are legally in force. 
Accordingly, reconsideration of the nature of the legal restriction that forbids 
trading of water appears warranted from an efficiency standpoint.  
 
25 Data Appendix:  Sales Price and Valuation Data Properties  
Sales Propensity 
We test the representativeness of the sales dataset relative to the 
(comprehensive) valuation dataset by estimating a probit regression in which the 
dependent variable is the probability of sale for any property in any year. The 
explanatory variables are the main variables that we choose for our structural 
estimates, i.e. log of land area (lnLAND), all three available irrigation variables 
(IRRIG, RATE, VOL), three land characteristics variables (RAIN, SLOPE, 
DRAIN), two distance variables, respectively to the nearest town and nearest city 
(DIST1, DIST2), plus year fixed effects and a constant. Our focus is on whether 
sales propensity is affected materially by these variables and, particularly, by any 
of the three irrigation variables. 
We estimate the probit regression only on properties that have not 
undergone any subdivision (or aggregation) over the 19-year period (1988-2006) 
to ensure that we match sale properties to a suitable universe of titles. In doing so, 
we form two samples, respectively including and excluding lifestyle blocks. The 
two samples are used to test robustness of our estimates. If sales are drawn 
randomly from the universe of properties, the explanatory variables will have no 
statistical significance and the overall explanatory power of the equation (pseudo-
R
2) will be low. 
Table A1 presents the probit results based on the two samples. Properties 
are more likely to be sold if they are larger; although the effect is minor for the 
more complete sample (implying that the exclusion of lifestyle blocks in the 
‘small’ sample is biasing the size result in that sample). In addition, location, 
slope and drainage characteristics affect sale propensity. In each case, consistent 
with the size estimate, the coefficients imply that properties will have a higher 
probability of sale if they are on high country land (high slope, poor drainage and 
distant from city and towns).  
Importantly for our purposes, however, none of the irrigation variables is 
linked to sales propensity. This finding is consistent with the maintained 
hypothesis of the study that irrigation characteristics are fully impounded into the 
sale price of the property; thus the presence and nature of irrigation should not 
26 affect sale propensity over and above any other property characteristic. Another 
feature of the probit results is that the pseudo-R
2 for both samples is very low, and 
especially so for the larger sample (0.0274). Thus, the estimated higher 
probability of sale for “high country” properties has very little overall predictive 
power for sale propensity. This finding is in keeping with comparison of the data 
summary statistics in Tables 1 and 2 showing little difference in sample means 
between the valuation and sales samples. Given these results, we treat the sales 
samples as constituting random samples from the larger valuation universe. 
 
Valuation Data Accuracy 
We test whether the valuation data constitute an unbiased predictor of the 
market (sales) prices of farms. To do so, we regress the (log of) total sales price 
including improvements (SALTOT) on the (log of the) most recent capital value 
(CV) of the farm (where CV equals land value plus improvements value), together 
with our core explanatory variables (lnLAND, RATE, RAIN, SLOPE, DRAIN, 
DIST1, DIST2). Year fixed effects are included since valuations are undertaken 
only three-yearly whereas sales are observed continuously; thus an observed sale 
price may not equal the most recent valuation even where that valuation was 
“accurate” at the valuation date.   
Our null hypothesis is that the coefficient on lnCV equals unity and 
coefficients on all remaining variables (other than the constant and time fixed 
effects) equal zero. It is particularly important for our purposes that the coefficient 
on the irrigation variable, RATE, is not significantly different from zero. If that 
were not the case, the implication would be that the valuation data do not 
adequately capture the market values placed on irrigation. 
We estimate the equation (using OLS with robust standard errors) for both 
sales price samples used in the main body of the paper as well as the two sub-
samples used for the probit equation  (Sample 1 – Sample 4 respectively). Results 
are presented in Table A2. For each sample, the coefficient on lnCV is positive 
and significantly different from zero (as hypothesized) but is also significantly 
different from unity; in three of the four samples, the coefficient on lnLAND is 
significantly greater than zero. No other coefficient (except for some of the 
27 unreported time fixed effects and constant) is consistently significantly different 
from zero at the 5% level. These results indicate that sales price is a positive 
function of capital valuation but that valuations may under-state the value of large 
farms relative to small farms. Our estimates in the main body of the paper control 
for lnLAND, thus compensating for this potential source of mis-valuation. 
For the purposes of this study, the coefficient on RATE is never 
significantly different from zero at the 5% level. In the large sample, it is positive 
and significant at the 10% level on a 1-tailed test, whereas in the other three 
samples, its t-statistic is in each case less than 0.4. Thus in three of the four 
samples we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the valuation data fully capture 
the market value attributable to irrigation. For the largest sample, however, there 
is some possibility that the valuation data may understate irrigation benefits. 






lnLAND  0.0300 0.1347 
  [3.217]*** [10.005]*** 
IRRIG  0.0285 0.0395 
  [0.232] [0.312] 
RATE  -0.1088 -0.0737 
  [0.900] [0.645] 
VOL  -1.1248 -1.0813 
  [1.219] [1.114] 
RAIN  0.000016 -0.000004 
  [0.106] [0.022] 
SLOPE  0.095 0.015 
  [3.850]*** [0.510] 
DRAIN  -0.014 -0.012 
  [2.408]** [1.806]* 
DIST1  0.000002 -0.000006 
  [0.798] [2.689]*** 
DIST2  -0.000008 -0.000011 
  [4.217]*** [5.146]*** 
Obs.  13205 13205 
Pseudo-R
2 0.0274 0.0809 
Notes: 
Dependent Variable is DSALEit = 1 if property i is sold in year t; = 0 otherwise  
Sample 1 includes lifestyle block sales. 
Sample 2 excludes lifestyle block sales. 
Robust z-statistics in brackets;   
*significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.  
 Time fixed effects and constant included (but not reported). 
 
29 Table A2: Sales Price Regressed on Capital Valuation and Farm Characteristics 
Sales Sample  Explanatory 
Variable  Sample 1  Sample 2  Sample 3  Sample 4 
lnCV  0.505186 0.535142 0.536448 0.555233 
  [7.642]*** [5.802]*** [4.637]*** [3.721]*** 
lnLAND  0.197477 0.147909 0.185802 0.134195 
  [5.364]*** [2.328]** [2.797]***  [1.136] 
RATE  0.025922 0.007545 0.005607 -0.000912 
  [1.339] [0.368] [0.272] [0.041] 
RAIN  -0.000461 -0.000523 -0.000597 -0.000678 
  [1.662]* [1.625] [1.676]*  [1.821]* 
SLOPE  0.007959 0.008162 -0.007249  -0.001811 
  [0.835] [0.633] [0.546] [0.106] 
DRAIN  -0.015656 0.007451 -0.001427 0.000308 
  [0.503] [0.131] [0.023] [0.004] 
DIST1  -0.000003 -0.000003 -0.000003 -0.000003 
  [1.325] [0.785] [0.565] [0.546] 
DIST2  -0.000006 -0.000004 0.000004  0.000005 
  [2.385]** [1.122]  [1.088]  [1.210] 
Obs.  665 413 312 273 
R
2 0.7181 0.6897 0.7359 0.6878 
RMSE  0.7123 0.7544 0.6833  0.721 
Notes: 
Samples 1 and 2 correspond to the ‘large’ and ‘small’ sales price samples used in the main body of 
the paper. Samples 3 and 4 correspond to the two sub-samples used for the probit regressions 
reported in Table A1. 
 
 
30 Figure 1: Location of irrigation consents in the Mackenzie District 
 
Source:  Environment Canterbury 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of average annual rainfall (mm) in Mackenzie District 
 
Source:  Landcare Research (Land Environments of New Zealand) 
 
31 Figure 3: Average slope of the land (degrees) in Mackenzie District 
 
Source:  Landcare Research (Land Environments of New Zealand) 
 
 
Figure 4: Soil drainage quality in the Mackenzie District 
 
Source:  Landcare Research (Land Environments of New Zealand) 
32 Table 1: Summary Statistics for all variables in main valuation sample 










Logged land value (NZ$) 
 
 
lnLAND  3.59611  2.652807  Logged area of property (m
2) 
RATE  .0362  .5570275  Maximum rate of irrigation water (l/s) over property 
area  
VOL  .0059041  .0684627  Maximum volume of irrigation water (m
3/day) over 
property area 
IRRIG  .0209966  .2384297  Irrigation area over property area 
RAIN  805.1816  150.0832  Average rainfall of each property (mm p.a.) 
SLOPE 4.407813  4.732518  Average slope of each property (degrees) 
DRAIN  3.997944  .9158189  Average drainage score of each property 
DIST1  22467.81  20443.09  Distance to nearest town (Fairlie, Geraldine, 
Temuka, or Timaru) (m) 
DIST2  57826.53  21350.23  Distance to Timaru (m) 
Memo Item: 
19 of 695 properties had a water right in 1988 (start of sample), 15 of which retained the water right 
for the entire sample 








Table 2: Summary statistics for all variables in main sales sample 










Logged sale price less improved value (NZ$) 
 
 
lnLAND  3.160063  2.544957  Logged area of property (m
2) 
RATE  .0493385  .5484844  Maximum rate of irrigation water (l/s) over property 
area  
VOL  .0141204  .0859315  Maximum volume of irrigation water (m
3/day) over 
property area 
IRRIG  .0745375  .403664  Irrigation area over property area 
RAIN  800.4022  137.957  Average rainfall of each property (mm p.a.) 
SLOPE 3.830603  4.45555  Average  slope of each property (degrees) 
DRAIN  4.131274  .9102215  Average drainage score of each property 
DIST1  26276.71  23786.24  Distance to nearest town (Fairlie, Geraldine, Temuka, 
or Timaru) (m) 
DIST2  61678.58  23550.11  Distance to Timaru (m) 
Memo Item: 
97 out of 713 properties sold between 1988 and 2006 had a water right 
616 out of 713 properties sold between 1988 and 2006 had no water right 
 
33  Table 3: Estimation Results for Sales Price Samples 
  ‘Large’ Sample  ‘Small’ Sample 
  No FE  MB FE  No FE  MB FE 
RATE  7.7027 7.4681  6.7262  8.0061 
  [3.753]*** [2.603]***  [4.478]*** [3.737]*** 
RATE*SOIt -0.0048 -0.0219  -0.0689  -0.0027 
  [0.121] [0.358]  [2.130]** [0.056] 
RATE*SOIt-1 0.0083 -0.0030  0.1501 0.0960 
  [0.360] [0.072]  [4.648]*** [1.960]** 
RATE*RAIN  -0.0025 -0.0029 0.0049 0.0060 
  [1.972]** [1.684]*  [2.460]** [2.002]** 
RATE*SLOPE  -0.1151 -0.0784  -0.0230 0.0157 
  [2.650]*** [1.122]  [0.730] [0.262] 
RATE*DRAIN  -1.3118 -1.1703  -1.0614  -1.2701 
  [4.079]*** [2.315]**  [6.396]*** [3.160]*** 
RATE*DIST1  -0.000083 -0.000065  -0.000174  -0.000184 
  [3.417]*** [1.822]*  [5.201]*** [3.376]*** 
RATE*DIST2  0.000031 0.000018  -0.000087  -0.000110 
  [1.504] [0.738]  [2.818]*** [2.859]*** 
lnLAND  0.4797 0.5117  0.4348  0.4921 
  [103.690]*** [82.620]*** [61.113]*** [38.471]*** 
RAIN  -0.0001 -0.0003  -0.0001  -0.0003 
  [1.580] [2.865]***  [1.151] [1.963]** 
SLOPE  -0.0127 -0.0148  -0.0163  -0.0198 
  [5.764]*** [3.600]***  [5.279]*** [4.147]*** 
DRAIN  0.0252 -0.0887  0.0335 0.0139 
  [3.659]*** [7.606]*** [2.212]**  [0.617] 
DIST1  0.000006   0.000003   
  [9.170]***  [1.757]*  
DIST2  -0.000007   -0.000005   
  [10.089]***  [3.897]***  
Observations  678 678  416  416 
R
2 (^) 0.6087 0.7179  0.5087  0.6447 
RMSE 
(^) 0.9279 0.8267  1.0302  0.9396 
Notes: 
Dependent variable is:  ln(SALESPRICE). 
All equations based on equation (6). Subscripts shown only where necessary for interpretation.  
Year fixed effects (FE) included in each equation but not reported.  
Column headed ‘No FE’ has no area fixed effects, corresponding to equation (7). 
Column headed ‘MB FE’ includes meshblock fixed effects (not reported), corresponding to equation (8). 
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets; ***significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%. 
 
(^) R
2 and RMSE are indicative only, being those from corresponding OLS estimates of the specification.  
  
34 Table 4: Estimation Results for Valuation Samples 
  ‘Large’ Sample  ‘Small’ Sample 
  No FE  MB FE  Farm FE  No FE  MB FE  Farm FE 
RATE  0.2874 0.0566  0.6747  0.4427 0.6246  0.8972 
  [1.496] [0.266]  [3.347]***  [1.156] [1.409]  [2.683]*** 
RATE*SOIt 0.0012  0.0032 0.0032 0.0003 -0.0001  -0.0008 
  [0.388] [0.807]  [0.951]  [0.080] [0.029]  [0.256] 
RATE*SOIt-1 -0.0009 -0.0024  -0.0022 0.0002  0.0008 0.0011 
  [0.404] [0.809]  [0.854]  [0.083] [0.316]  [0.422] 
RATE*RAIN  -0.0004 -0.0005  -0.0002 0.0002  -0.0003 0.0001 
  [2.241]** [1.804]* [1.625]  [0.287] [0.397]  [0.292] 
RATE*SLOPE  -0.0045 0.0102  -0.0283  -0.0231 -0.0282  -0.0439 
  [0.848] [1.831]*  [3.454]***  [1.575] [1.702]*  [3.210]*** 
RATE*DRAIN  -0.0252 0.0666  -0.1258  -0.1258 -0.1225  -0.2348 
  [4.236]*** [4.936]*** [2.564]**  [1.496]  [1.459] [3.055]*** 
RATE*DIST1  -0.000009 -0.000001 -0.00002 -0.00003  -0.00002 -0.00003 
  [3.042]*** [0.327]  [3.977]***  [2.434]** [2.078]** [3.478]*** 
RATE*DIST2  0.000006 0.000002  0.000009  0.000007 0.000012  0.000011 
  [2.237]** [0.413]  [2.992]***  [0.992] [1.201]  [1.856]* 
lnLAND  0.6961  0.8207   0.9284  0.9452  
  [93.517]*** [120.035]***   [146.582]*** [172.600]***  
RAIN  -0.0004 -0.0004    0.0002  0.0004   
  [4.761]*** [4.998]***    [2.108]** [3.526]***   
SLOPE  -0.0663  -0.0710   -0.0672  -0.0672  
  [26.029]*** [31.213]***   [26.090]*** [23.817]***   
DRAIN  -0.0126  -0.1286   -0.0825  -0.1017  
  [0.924] [9.575]***    [4.685]*** [5.323]***   
DIST1  0.000001     -0.000019    
  [1.045]     [13.272]***    
DIST2  -0.000002    -0.000013    
  [2.023]**     [13.968]***    
Observations  3951 3951  3951  2702  2702  2702 
R
2 (^) 0.6725 0.7856  0.9738  0.8444 0.8906  0.9845 
RMSE 
(^) 1.2128 0.9949  0.3775  0.9489 0.8044  0.3234 
Notes: 
Dependent variable is:  ln(VALUATION). 
All equations based on equation (6). Subscripts shown only where necessary for interpretation.  
Year fixed effects (FE) included in each equation but not reported.  
Column headed ‘No FE’ has no area fixed effects, corresponding to equation (7). 
Column headed ‘MB FE’ includes meshblock fixed effects (not reported), corresponding to equation (8). 
Column headed ‘Farm FE’ includes farm fixed effects (not reported), corresponding to equation (9). 
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets; ***significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%. 
 
(^) R
2 and RMSE are indicative only, being those from corresponding OLS estimates of the specification.  
  
 
35 Table 5: Irrigation Premia for 5 Cases using Estimated Valuation and Sales Price Equations 
Irrigation Premium   
CASE 





1)  No exceptions (baseline)  0.39% -21.59% 
2)  DRAIN less 1 std.dev.  5.66% 23.45% 
3)  DIST1  less 1 std.dev.  14.41% 53.27% 
4)  RAIN, SLOPE, DRAIN each less 0.5 std.dev.  7.23% 14.74% 
5)  As for 4) with RATE = 2 x mean  14.99% 31.66% 
Notes: 
Valuation equation uses ‘large’ sample with farm fixed effects (from Table 4). 
Sales price equation uses ‘large’ sample with meshblock fixed effects (from Table 3). 
Irrigation premium calculated using expressions (10) and (11).  
Baseline calculation sets all variables to sample means.  
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